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This thesis provides a longitudinal review of the Mexican military’s relationship with the 
state. From 1910 to 2014, the events, rhetoric, and geopolitical representations of the 
Mexican Revolution are assessed in terms of the resulting changes to the military’s 
mission, role, and organization. 
The research identifies the revolutionary influence that still remains after the 
seventy-one year rule of the PRI. Additionally, it discusses some of the historical effects 
of civilian control within the institution and how the military is controlled under 
legislative rule today. Furthermore, it provides a review of military policy through the 
peaceful transition from the Institutional Revolutionary Party, referred as the PRI 
(Partido Revolucionario Institucional), to the National Action Party, referred as the PAN 
(Partido Acción Nacional), and back to the PRI in 2012. Finally, it discusses the 
contemporary Mexican military in terms of how its loyalty and professionalism will 
propel it into the international scene despite the human rights violations.  
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The Mexican military has experienced an organizational transformation under 
civilian rule in the last eighty-five years. In explaining the seventy-one year rule of the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party; PRI), and the last 
fourteen years since the transition to the Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party; 
PAN) and back to the PRI, this thesis will attempt to answer the primary thesis question: 
do the events, rhetoric, and geopolitical representations of the Mexican Revolution 
still influence the contemporary narrative and ethos of the Mexican military? 
Answering this question will involve a longitudinal review of the Mexican military after 
the Revolution, through the 1960s and 1970s, and finally from 2000 to the present as 
these were the periods where its role and mission changed the most while it transitioned 
between objective and subjective civilian control. The type of military control affected 
the utilization and development of the Mexican military into more of a tool of the state 
rather than only as the protector of a particular party. 
This thesis explores the evolution of the Mexican military’s organization and 
relationship with the state from the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) to 2014. The 
Revolution provided a common ground for civilian and military elites, which indirectly 
shaped and circumscribed the role of the armed forces today. This revolutionary 
ideology, through subjective and objective civilian control, saw the professionalization 
and subordination of the armed forces, which enabled politicians to secure overall 
control. The fact that many generals after the Revolution became president helped 
organize and form the military under the PRI.1 
In addition to providing an overall historical review, the narrative focuses on the 
military’s mission and organization from the end of Revolution to 2000, specifically in 
the last fourteen years, identifying any influence that still remains within the ruling 
1 Monica Serrano, “The Armed Branch of the State: Civil-Military Relations in Mexico,” Journal of 
Latin American Studies 2 (May 1995): 429, accessed September 6, 2014, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/158121?origin=JSTOR-pdf. 
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institution. It also provides a thorough review of civil-military relations with respect to 
the change of military policy through the peaceful transition from the PRI to the PAN in 
2000 and 2006, and the shift of power back to the PRI in 2012.  
After the Mexican Revolution and under the PRI, the army’s loyalty and 
submission to the ruling party helped maintain the political stability in Mexico 
throughout the twentieth century. The fact that the army was not involved in political 
matters and helped sustain the regime made the civil-military relationship a mutual one.2 
Despite gaining autonomy in exchange for its obedience, the military’s role and mission 
remained unclear through decades until the 1930s and 1940s. President Lázaro Cárdenas 
first assigned the army the role in forjando la patria (nation-building), in an attempt to 
expand the central government’s control.3 During this time, the PRI strategically 
controlled the army for its use with the goal of professionalization of the armed forces for 
subordination under the civilian political elite; this allowed them to secure total control 
and manage the state’s institution.4  
Subsequently, the military maintained a great deal of political influence that 
declined by 1946. That influence, which the military attained since World War II, was a 
byproduct of the crisis management role it possessed. However, since the student 
uprisings in 1968, military leaders have been reluctant to participate in crisis situations, 
preferring to deflect these actions to local and state police authorities.5  
As will be discussed later, the move towards a more professional force and the 
civil-military relationship attributed to the lack of military coup d’états in Mexico. 
Because of the lack of an external threat, requiring an outlined role and mission, the 
military remained the political tool of the PRI. Civilian control after the Revolution 
affected the army’s mission and role and also gave the military some autonomy.  
2 Roderic Camp, Generals in the Palacio (London: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
3 Stephen J. Wager and Army War College (U.S.), The Mexican Military Approaches the 21st 
Century: Coping With a New World Order (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 
War College, 1994), 4. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/1994/mexican/mexican.pdf. 
4 Serrano, “Armed Branch of the State,” 433. 
5 Wager and Army War College (U.S.), Mexican Military Approaches the 21st Century, 11. 
 2 
                                                 
B. THESIS STATEMENT 
The Mexican military experienced many factors and events, which contributed to 
its contemporary organization and mission. After the Revolution, civilian control—
both subjective and objective—affected the army’s role, which remained consistent until 
the twenty-first century. As Stephen Wager stated, “The civilianization of power took 
away the army’s direct role in political decision making, and the country’s new civilian 
leaders assigned the military the role of guarantor and protector of the overall system.”6 
Some of these factors and events include the long seventy-one year rule of the 
PRI, the search for an identity and establishing its mission, and the move towards 
legislative rule in the twenty-first century. Throughout Mexico’s history, the army 
transitioned as the PRI’s political tool for increased power to an institution with domestic 
missions and roles, which were mainly maintaining internal security: suppressing the 
railroad workers’ strike in 1958, student movement in 1968, and the pacification of social 
unrest and combatting guerrilla uprisings in the southern state of Guerrero throughout the 
1960s.7 Through the management of other crisis situations—the armed repression of 
dissident groups, counterinsurgency campaigns against rural guerrillas, and the breaking 
of major labor strikes—the military also endorsed the PRI and helped it remain in power. 
In return for the service and backing, the military received regular salary increases and a 
variety of generous non-wage benefits such as housing, medical care, loans, and 
subsidized consumer goods.8 
With the change in power in 2000, President Vicente Fox (PAN party) dismantled 
the arrangement between the hegemonic PRI and the armed forces. He established a 
democratic civil-military relationship where the military did not answer to only one party, 
but instead was established under legislative oversight. This oversight created a means to 
6 Wager and Army War College (U.S.), Mexican Military Approaches the 21st Century, 11. 
7 Jordi Díez, Ian Nicholls, and Army War College (U.S.), The Mexican Armed Forces in Transition 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 9, accessed November 21, 2014, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB638.pdf. 
8 Wayne Cornelius and Ann L. Craig, The Mexican Political System in Transition (San Diego, CA: 
Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1991), 85–95. And Ricardo R. Gómez-Vilchis, “Democratic Transition 
and Presidential Approval in Mexico, Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 1 (2012), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/msem.2012.28.1.43. 
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keep executive power in check and to establish hierarchy in the absence of a unified 
Department of Defense.9  
Research shows that the military continues to be influenced by such events and 
actions that originated from the Revolution and as such, continue to affect its rule and 
rhetoric. Today, Mexico possesses a sui generis defense establishment that is made up of 
two institutions: the Department of National Defense (SEDENA), which includes the 
Army and the Air Force (FAM); and the Secretariat of the Marines (SEMAR), made up 
of the Navy (ARM). This unique style of organization dates back to 1940 when the 
Department of the Navy was established as an autonomous entity separate from the 
Ministry of War. The following year the Navy Department received full cabinet ministry 
status, which provided financial and operational independence to implement the 
country’s maritime policy.10 Within the Department of National Defense’s chain of 
command, the President became the commander-in-chief with direct and complete 
control over the armed forces via SEDENA and SEMAR. Today, each department 
continues to be headed by an active duty four-star general-secretary and admiral-
secretary, respectively; however, its hierarchy became more established after World War 
II. In 1942, Mexico fought with the allies against Germany in exchange for economic aid, 
which helped strengthen the Mexican armed forces. Even though Mexico’s contribution 
was mostly raw materials, labor, and exports, the relationship with the United States 
contributed to the establishment of a stronger military institution.11  
C. METHODOLOGY 
Most of the research was accomplished through a comparative study approach, 
which included the review of a wide variety of primary and secondary sources that helped 
9 Jordi Díez, “Legislative Oversight of the Armed Forces in Mexico.” Mexican Studies 1 (Winter, 
2008): 118, http://search.proquest.com/docview/205252509?accountid=12702. 
10 Inigo Guevara Moyano and Army War College (U.S.), Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing 
Under Fire: The Mexican Military, 2006–11, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2011), 2, accessed September 9, 2014, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1081. 
11 Mary Patrice Koscielny and Center for International Studies (U.S.), Mexico: Yesterday and Today 
(Washington, DC: Center for International Studies, 1994), 26, accessed September 11, 2014, 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED398106.pdf. 
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answer the research question. Through the review of these documents and sources that 
also included journal and newspaper articles, speeches, essays, and books, it was apparent 
that the literature was focused on the evolution and ideology associated with structuring 
the modern military from its origins in the Mexican Revolution. There were pertinent 
intersections, which connect the overall transition through three major periods—long rule 
under the PRI beginning in 1929, the 1960s and 1970s, and the transition of power and 
hierarchy in 2000. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In general, the Mexican military experienced great change in its structure and 
mission under civilian rule since the Mexican Revolution. Through the reorganization 
after the Revolution to the lack of reform in 2000, the direction and purpose remained 
unclear until the twenty-first century with the PAN rule. In exploring the research 
question there are two hypotheses of what further research on the Mexican military will 
help prove.  
The first hypothesis is the leadership and structure of the contemporary Mexican 
military was directly shaped by the events and actions of the Mexican Revolution. 
Through the research and literature reviewed, there are scholarly works which seem to 
explain the above: the means by how military leaders are selected now is not much 
different from after the Revolution, and the hierarchy of power and direction has also 
remained consistent. Even though the intent of the government is to place the most 
qualified military leaders in important military posts, it is not always the case depending 
on who is in office. More often, high military positions are filled by individuals who 
political leaders see as the most loyal and less demanding, than are qualified. Moreover, 
this standard of practice explains the reason for the lack of military coup d’états. 
The second hypothesis outlines that because of the political and military 
instability of the Revolution and its conformity to civilian rule, the Mexican military has 
never gained political control like other militaries across other Latin American countries. 
The struggle for power from the Mexican Revolution to the end of the PRI, and 
subsequently from 2000 to 2014, highlights a major question associated with the 
 5 
outcomes of such. The most apparent question post revolution to 2000 is: why has the 
military, regardless of power and support, or lack thereof, managed to remain loyal 
through the various transitions? Unlike many countries in Latin America that experienced 
military coup d’états, what kept Mexico’s military from forcefully taking control of all 
power during the various periods of disorganization and uncertainty? Under civilian 
control, the military remained completely removed from the political arena after 1940 in 
exchange for autonomy that was not remarkably significant. Yet, despite the challenges 
and pleads for the military to have a more significant role in Mexico’s system, political 
leaders have succeeded in keeping military leaders at bay by ensuring conformity in 
exchange for allowing additional internal control of operations and more say in budget 
discussions. Some factors, which have assured military conformity and loyalty, are the 
restriction of power that originated from the constitution of 1917. These politician-led 
initiatives kept radicals out of military roles, and ultimately prevented any military 
reform. 
E. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
After gaining independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century, Mexico 
followed a path to nationalism—strengthened by conflicts with the United States and 
France—that developed through the Revolution of 1910. At the end of the nineteenth 
century, the victory over France brought a sense of identity and ethos, which allowed the 
military to be seen more as a political tool of authoritarians, trying to remain in power, 
rather than a force to combat external security threats to the country. The military began 
to form as Benito Juarez’s forces, at Puebla on May 5, 1862, fought and won against a 
superior French army. This victory became more of a spiritual celebration than Mexico’s 
actual Independence Day because the military ethos began to form under civilian rule.12 
Taking into consideration the optimism the victory formed, the official will or means to 
modernize or reform the military was delayed until the twentieth century.  
12 “The New Mexican Editorial: Cinco De Mayo: Celebrating a Shared Heritage,” The Santa Fe New 
Mexican, May 05, 2002, http://search.proquest.com/docview/331445725?accountid=12702. 
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1. Military during the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) 
Following the French intervention, the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz came into 
power signifying the beginning of industrialization and a competition for power by elites. 
Despite the intentions to modernize the country—including the establishment of the 
railroad—the agrarian sector was at a disadvantage and thus began to demand power and 
support, which was petitioned but quickly ignored leading up to 1910. This period also 
gave rise to an attempt to unify the military to combat the revolutionary armies that were 
beginning to form, specifically under Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata. President Díaz 
“order and progress in Mexico between 1876 and 1910 caused the Revolution of 1910 in 
the Mexican border states . . . ‘order’ meant political centralization which came at the 
expense of local privileges and customs.”13  
President Díaz’s push towards the rapid commercialization of the agrarian sector 
in the North, and later for a democratic Mexico—that included a political system that was 
unpopular with the elites—and his unwillingness to step down in 1910, gave rise to the 
Revolution. Francisco I. Maduro, a prominent statesman at the time, was the mastermind 
behind the Revolution against President Díaz, and his policies, utilized a military that was 
fragile and unprepared for a guerilla war.14 Despite the challenges and lack of resources, 
Maduro was able to gain support from those who were dissatisfied with the economic 
trends and unhappy with the Porfiarian period. Later, as president, Maduro’ s attempt to 
reform Mexico’s political system became difficult as it led to a civil war that the military 
could not suppress in Mexico post 1910.15 During the fight for power, the power 
pendulum shifted across three major parties that forced a government collapse and also 
led to the revolutionary accession of power. The retention of power occurred after the 
military collapse of the federal army in 1913 and 1914. As a result of the state’s failure to 
control or adequately manage the military, the power of the armed forces ceased to 
remain centralized and became fragmented among the competing revolutionary 
13 David E. Lorey, U.S.-Mexican Border in the Twentieth Century (Delaware: Scholarly Resources 
Inc., 1999), 56. 
14 Ibid, 59 and 62. 
15 Ibid, 62–63. 
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chieftains. This move further prevented the armed forces from defining an already 
unclear role in security affairs.16  
During the late nineteenth century, Mexico had one of the worst records of 
military intervention in politics, which allowed cacique-loyal armies to be used as 
political forces. They served not only as vehicles for social mobility, but also as means to 
control social unrest with the public dissatisfaction with the existing government. Even 
though Benito Juárez and Porfirio Díaz attempted to curb the military, it still remained a 
decisive element in politics through the influence it had on a selection of leaders until the 
mid-twentieth century.17 Later, the progressive civilianization of power took away the 
army’s direct role in political decision-making, and the country’s new civilian leaders 
assigned the military the role of guarantor and protector of the overall system.18  
However, the lack of a strong, state-led military allowed the Mexican Revolution 
to occur and thus initiated the road of modernization. The Revolution introduced a period 
wherein the military began to move towards establishing its mission and role under 
President Álvaro Obregón. Following the uprising at Agua Prieta in July 1920—conflict 
over whether Venustiano Carranza’s civilian moderates or Obregòn’s military radicals 
would rule Mexico—the Obregònistas (followers of Obregòn) attempted to reorganize 
what was left of the army under its ideals. At that point, it became imperative to purge the 
army of left over Carrancistas (followers of Carranza) to break the resistance of general 
officers unhappy with the new government and its established objectives for future use.19 
Subsequently, President Obregòn’s move to structure the military by putting generals on 
the federal payroll and providing social security to all soldiers, gradually removed the 
military’s power and influence from the formal party system.20 This move became an 
important juncture in Mexican politics as the government began removing the military’s 
16 Brian R. Hamnett, Concise History of Mexico (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 237. 
17 Daniel C. Levy and Kathleen Bruhn, Mexico: The Struggle for Democratic Development, 2nd ed. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 54. 
18 Wager and Army War College (U.S.), Mexican Military Approaches the 21st Century, 1. 
19 Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army 1910–
1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1968), 48 and 61–62. 
20 Levy and Bruhn, Mexico: Struggle for Democratic Development, 54–55. 
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influence from the political realm, which was the beginning of the revolutionary 
narrative. 
The revolutionary narrative, which is discussed throughout this thesis, is referred 
to in terms of the military’s loyalty and ethos and its civilian-military relationship. It 
includes elements such as revolutionary ideals, which allowed the military to remain 
subordinate to civilian authority and the establishment of the military’s role as solely a 
domestic service army. Also, it directly relates to the various levels of autonomy 
bestowed to the armed forces and its administration since the Revolution. 
Finally, Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata came into the picture and together 
pushed the ideals they wanted to accomplish through the conflict. The Mexican 
Revolution became the catalyst for identity-building and unity by fighting for individual 
rights and those rights of the poor. Trying to capitalize on the weak military and overall 
discontent, they were able to build armies strong enough to challenge the powerful elite 
and validate the weaknesses within the government.  
2. Military Post-Mexican Revolution  
The period after the Revolution was important in the formation of the Mexican 
military and its rhetoric. The military endured a reduction in force that included the 
removal of the old army, who had fought in the Revolution, and the creation of a force 
loyal to the ideals of the PRI. During the warring years, as a result of combining regional 
forces with the remnants of the national army, the total forces numbered over two 
hundred thousand with fifty thousand officers, some five hundred who claimed to be 
generals. President-elect Carranza (1917–1920) assigned the task of dissolving the 
Constitutionalist Army and creating a smaller national army to his Minister of War, 
General Álvaro Obregón. He created the Legion of Honor of the National Army, which 
allowed officers to retain their rank and still receive full pay for volunteering to leave 
active duty. Those that did not leave voluntarily were reviewed and many were sent to the 
reserves at half pay.21 President Carranza continued to reorganize the military but made 
little progress and change, which was attributed to the lack of military funding and 
21 Lieuwen, “Mexican Militarism,” 45. 
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budget. In perspective, during Obregón’s presidency, the army received thirty-one 
percent of the government’s budget compared to an all-time high of seventy-two percent 
of the national budget during Carranza’s first year of presidency. In the last three years of 
the Carranza term the army received an average of sixty-five percent of the budget each 
year.22 
President Álvaro Obregón revamped the War College curriculum and began 
sending young officers overseas to receive important military education, which included 
learning modern military techniques. In building the army, he issued the first regulation 
uniforms to all members and instituted daily wear, which created the first military ethos 
and further allowed professionalization to occur. He also depoliticized the military by 
forbidding military participation in any political activity by assigning them to a more 
civic role of repairing railroads, and constructing roads and irrigation systems. This civic 
role became the mainstay of the Mexican army after Obregón left office in 1929, and also 
provided a means for the military to satisfy their revolutionary commitments helping 
develop the economic well-being of the country.  
Following President Obregón’s reduction of over half of the military in the mid-
1920s, President Plutarco Elías Calles introduced important regulations governing the 
armed forces under civilian rule, and presented changes to civil-military relations. Some 
of those changes included reintroducing Porfiarian rotation practices and establishing 
regulations that further governed armed institutions. After leaving office in 1929, 
President Calles founded the Party of the National Revolution (PNR: Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario), a political party that co-opted different segments of Mexican society 
into a corporatist state. Joaquín Amaro, secretary of the Army and Navy under Calles, 
was a focal point in making the armed forces more professional.23  
The military was then purposely omitted from the party since Calles thought the 
political sectors of labor, peasants, and bureaucrats would offset their influence. The new 
elite reinvigorated the state’s effort to redefine the nation’s identity, pursuing what 
22 Lieuwen, “Mexican Militarism,” 153 
23 Serrano, “Armed Branch of the State,” 432. 
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President Calles touted as a “psychological revolution,” which would begin to use the 
military as a shield and tool for maintaining power for the PRI.24 This period became the 
cornerstone for the organization of the Mexican military and how it would be controlled 
and managed throughout the twenty-first century. The perspective behind the military 
organization and structure involved a two-pronged approach that centered on the 
prevention of any future U.S. invasion upon Mexican national (territorial) sovereignty, as 
well as the promotion of a state-led and nationalistic economy. 25 This was referred to by 
Samuel P. Huntington as “the most striking example of political institution building by 
generals.”26 During this period there was little distinction between the government and 
the military.  
Even though there was a push to establish and formalize the military as an 
institution, the approach was restricted by future leaders who wanted it be relevant 
without giving it the ability to possess power and influence in politics. The first of those 
leaders who restricted the formal organization of the military was President Lázaro 
Cárdenas (1934–1940). President Cárdenas accelerated professionalization of the armed 
forces through civilian control. His intent was to contain the military by neutralizing the 
weight and influence of the military through the incorporation of labor sectors within the 
PNR.27 During his presidency, he established the formation of a military that was not to 
be seen as “professional soldiers . . . but rather as armed auxiliaries organized from 
humble classes . . . the duty of young officers [was] to broaden the collective spirit of the 
nation and help incorporate the humble into the whole program of the Revolution.”28 
Also during Cárdenas’ administration, one of the most important changes occurred where 
24 A. Bantjes, “Burning Saints, Molding Minds: Iconoclasm, Civic Ritual, and the Failed Cultural 
Revolution,” in W. Beezley, C. E. Martin and W. E. French (eds.), Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: 
Public Celebrations and Popular Culture in Mexico (Wilmington, DE: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1994), 265. 
25 James Rochlin, “Redefining Mexican ‘National Security’ During an Era of Postsovereignty,” 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Local, Political (Sept 1995): 371, accessed September 5, 2014, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644838. 
26 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1968), 255. 
27 Serrano, “Armed Branch of the State,” 433. 
28 Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, 120. 
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the creation of four sectors within a reformed party (workers, popular, peasant, and the 
military) were formed. This change enabled the president to decrease the influence of the 
military as it became one of the four voting members. These developments placed an 
important emphasis on developing a deep sense of loyalty to the president and the official 
party, contributing to civilian supremacy. 29  
When Cárdenas left office in 1940, the armed forces had been weakened and 
brought firmly under the control of the national party. Throughout the 1940s, the military 
continued to be removed from the political process as they agreed to support civilian 
authority.30 Following his tenure, it was not until the end of the PRI rule in 2000 that 
President Fox attempted to organize the contemporary military more as a structure to 
combat domestic challenges and issues across the country. During the first PAN 
presidency, the formal transition of the military under legislative rule began. Legislative 
rule further developed under two consecutive terms of the PAN and most recently with 
the PRI presidency, which highlighted changes in the military’s modern structure of the 
last fourteen years.  
By the 1940s, the Mexican Army was thought to be sufficiently organized and 
equipped to meet the demands of protecting the country and its territories. Just what 
would be its potential value in Hemisphere Defense was a matter of some conjecture, 
since in the past there had been little expectation that it would be called upon to repel an 
invasion in force. After World War II, the military saw improvements to its structure as it 
was strengthened to combat future domestic threats, but its organization remained status 
quo until 2000.31 By the early 1950s, the military institution had been unified, 
disciplined, and subordinated to civilian power. This relationship between the official 
party and the military, which is sometimes referred to as a “pact” by some scholars on 
29 Díez, “Legislative Oversight,” 121. See also Monica Serrano, “The Armed Branch of the State: 
Civil-Military Relations in Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Studies 2 (1995): 432.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Koscielny, Mexico: Yesterday and Today, 26. 
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civil-military relations in Mexico, became a strong and harmonious association that lasted 
for several decades as both parties respected their end of the deal.32  
The military was called on by the PRI to help out through difficult times. This 
was the case in 1958, when they were asked to suppress a railroad workers’ strike, and 
again in the early 1970s, when tasked with the “elimination” of guerrillas, especially 
those in the southern state of Guerrero. But these interventions were temporary and the 
armed forces returned to the barracks once the situation was stabilized. In all of these 
cases, the army acted upon the request of the civilian authority without affecting the 
pact.33 
3. Transition from the 1950s through 2000 
The time period after President Cárdenas’ presidency validated the need to control 
the military as various countries across Latin America in the twentieth century 
experienced military coup d’états and democratization. In Mexico, however, the military 
remained restricted in flexing its power despite the overall discontent with the 
government and social problems the country experienced. Even though the military did 
not intervene in politics, it was consistently mobilized by the government to pacify some 
of the social unrest and movements. In order to prevent shirking, “when the military, 
whether through laziness, indolence, or preventable incompetence, does not do what the 
civilian has requested, or not in the way the civilian wanted, or in such a way as to 
undermine the ability of the civilian to make future decisions,” the Mexican government 
provided military prerogatives.34 Monica Serrano explains how the military remained out 
of politics: 
The implications of changes in tasks and responsibilities assigned to or 
taken by the military have been evident in the evolution of military 
prerogatives, from distortions in promotions patterns, to surges in military 
demands leading to increases in the military budget, in the size of the 
armed forces, the development of military industries and a more forceful 
32 Díez, “Legislative Oversight,” 121. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Peter D. Feaver, “Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American 
Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 24 (1998): 409–410. 
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participation in policy and decision-making. Indeed, the control of rail 
workers, strikes during the 1950s, as well as of student movements in 
Guerrero and San Luis Potosi, and the more recent participation of the 
armed forces in Chiapas were soon reflected in defence procurements. The 
role of the armed forces in counterinsurgency throughout the 1960s and 
during the 1968 student movement was subsequently compensated by 
increases in the total number of promotions, new procurements and a new 
expansion involving 1o,ooo troops. Similarly, throughout the 1980s a new 
trend became evident which involved the military actively in decisions 
concerning public order.35 
By the 1950s, the Mexican military was under firm civilian control. It was a 
professional fighting force that completely removed its officers from all political 
aspirations.36 Although civilian control minimized the military’s influence in politics, it 
continued to have a great effect on the military’s domestic role, specifically in domestic 
policing after 1960. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Mexican army was forced to fulfill 
roles that were beyond the scope of their experience. PRI leadership deployed the army to 
pacify and combat student protest movements and revolutionary guerrilla groups, which 
for the first time negatively stained the military’s image and purpose. In the Tlatelolco 
massacre of 1968, the army used extreme violence against the civilian population, where 
dozens of people disappeared, and no action or accountability occurred. This event was a 
crucial turning point because it highlighted the deficiencies within the military judicial 
system. Until recently, military personnel enjoyed immunity from prosecution within the 
civilian judicial system. However, because of the human rights violations plaguing the 
institution, civil suits are rising and the old civilian-military pact is beginning to break 
down.37  
According to the constitution, the armed forces have three central objectives 
guiding their deployment: defending national territory against an external threat; 
providing humanitarian support to the civilian population after natural disasters; and 
guaranteeing internal security and social peace. The first two objectives received 
35 Serrano, “Armed Branch of the State,” 439. 
36 Aaron W. Navarro, Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938–1954 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2010), 79–80. 
37“Mexico: Military Resists Greater Civilian Control,” Oxford: Oxford Analytica Ltd, 2002, accessed 
October 7, 2014, http://search.proquest.com/docview/192317850?accountid=12702. 
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widespread support and were uncontroversial. The continuing role of the military in 
guaranteeing internal order, however, came under increased scrutiny due to the poor 
handling of the human rights situation. Mexican civil society had been demanding greater 
accountability from the armed forces and a review of their participation in activities that 
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE MEXICAN MILITARY’S ROLE  
AND MISSION 
A. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MEXICAN MILITARY 
In comparison to other Latin American countries, Mexico has been a model of 
civil-military harmony. The fact that Mexico has not experienced a successful coup since 
1920 demonstrates that this relationship between the two institutions has been a mutual 
one; civilians control the politics of the nation, and the military, while subordinate to 
civilian control, demonstrates the highest levels of professionalism and loyalty to 
control.39 The civilian-military relationship in Mexico originates from the early 
nineteenth century after Mexico gained its independence. After the Mexican Revolution 
in the early twentieth century, two variables emerged to further establish the relationship: 
societal experiences and how these related to the military’s narrative and role.  
The Mexican military experienced a transition from objective to subjective 
civilian control, which affected its role and mission from the end of the seventy-one year 
rule of the PRI in 2000 to 2014. To explain this transition and its effects, it is important to 
define both objective and subjective control, discuss how civilian control originated in 
Mexico, and finally explain how civilian control affected the roles and missions of the 
armed forces across the various time frames, which culminates with the presidency of 
Enrique Peña Nieto. 
Samuel P. Huntington explains objective and subjective civilian control of the 
armed forces. Under objective control civilians dictate military security policy, but allow 
the military to determine the objectives required to implement and manage itself. 
Huntington mentions that objective rule stems from “the institutional separation of the 
military forces from society . . . [maintaining] the proper distance between the military 
forces and politics, and their professional autonomy.”40 Under objective civilian control, 
39 Linda Alexander Rodriguez, Rank and Privilege: The Military and Society in Latin America 
(Wilmington, DE.: Scholarly Resources, 1994), 219–220. 
40 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military 
Relations (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 260–261. 
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“[civilians] not only reduce the power of the military to the lowest possible level vis-á-vis 
all civilian groups, but it also maximizes the likelihood of achieving military security.”41 
By separating political functions from military decision-making, both are more respected; 
political leaders do not interfere in military operations, and military commanders do not 
influence policy-making. This deepens military professionalism—in terms of expertise, 
service responsibility, and corporateness—in the eyes of civilians. In turn, the military is 
politically neutral and produces the lowest level of power with respect to all civilian 
groups.  
To not totally disregard the military’s role, a tradeoff occurs: civilians grant 
officers autonomy when they demonstrate professional aptitude; in return, officers show 
respect and loyalty to the politician’s authority.42 The values of loyalty and patriotism 
placed the nation, the state and its institutions, and the military in descending order of 
importance; the state retaining its superiority over the military was a derivative of the 
Revolution.43 
Under subjective civilian control, however, the military is in essence civilianized; 
it becomes a mirror of the state in a variety of forms. Through the denial of the 
independent military sphere, civilians aim to maximize the governing political leader’s 
power—usually through some particular civilian group or groups—by encouraging 
members of the armed forces to identify with their goals or political ideologies. 
Subjective civilian control also creates a conflict between civilian control and military 
security requirements; intensified security threats can lead to increased military 
imperatives where it becomes even more difficult to assert civilian rule. In other words, 
enhanced civilian control under this type undermines military security which in turn 
reduces an independent military sphere.44 
41 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 83–86. 
42 Ibid., 85. 
43 Rodriguez, Rank and Privilege, 224. 
44 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 83– 85. 
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B. MEXICAN POLITICAL POWER (1930–1950) 
After the Revolution, the military maintained a great deal of political influence; 
by 1946 that influence, in terms of overt control, had declined. After 1968, the military’s 
indirect political influence increased again, but this time it had no effect on politics, 
forcing it to remain subordinate to civilian control. Military officers were a byproduct of 
a larger society that, through its values and attitudes, affected how civilians viewed their 
roles. Through a historical lens, the military’s role and involvement in internal politics 
determined the civil-military patterns, which helped create the present-day military in 
Mexico.45  
The Mexican military in the late 1930s and 1940s was a focal point in politics as 
it secured support for the ruling party in return for influence in the political arena; during 
this time period there was a stint of subjective control that later transitioned more towards 
objective control. Under the PRI, the military was established as a pretense to secure 
political power; its most important role was “an agent of social and political control.”46 
In 1940, the military’s political power began to decrease as civilians realized that the 
military’s influence in politics was hindering their progress. The officers’ politicking and 
entrepreneurialism challenged and discredited the central government, which forced them 
to adopt a more apolitical identity for the army.47  
By 1950, politicians took away most of the influence the military once had by 
creating four sectors within the reformed party: workers, popular, peasant, and military. 
This allowed the president to decrease the influence by restricting the military to only a 
small portion of the vote and influence within the party.48 For military leadership, this 
lack of influence further validated the need to avoid political repression and economic 
reprisals by bandwagoning and providing additional support to the electoral power. In 
45 Roderic Ai Camp, “Mexico,” in The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook, ed. 
Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 271. 
46 Thomas Rath, Myths of Demilitarization in Post-revolutionary Mexico, 1920–1960 (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 168. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Díez, “Legislative Oversight,” 121. 
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exchange for this national loyalty, the military for the most part enjoyed autonomy.49 
Once the officer’s political powers were taken, the PRI regime could regulate differences 
between the military’s official rhetoric and reality. However, the military—depending on 
their loyalty—could still inflict some influence and retain operational autonomy.50 The 
infighting in the 1940s and 1950s restricted the army’s unity and created political rules 
that guaranteed an incomplete separation from the government.  
President Lázaro Cárdenas’ attempt to formalize class identity and the Mexican 
army’s solidarity eventually disappeared. Instead, Cardenistas criticized the military 
structure, calling it an organization of workers and peasants who were “led by idealists of 
the middle class.”51 This structure, based on revolutionary ideology, was embraced by 
soldiers who “spread sincerity, honor, and virtue . . . [to act] like ‘an elder brother of the 
Mexican family.’” 52  
Even though the military structure underwent changes, civilians continued to 
minimize its influence and involvement in society. However, the “formal civilian 
supremacy did not strip the military of all political influence as they operated behind the 
scenes to facilitate political communication and conflict resolution.”53 Since the 
nineteenth century, politicians accomplished this by constantly moving commanders 
across the country throughout various “army zones of command,” which became more 
evident during President Cárdenas’ presidency.54 Mexico is broken down into military 
zone commands—forty army zones and twenty-two naval zones—which are grouped 
together among twelve military regions and under a senior zone commander. Although 
49 Rath, Myths of Demilitarization, 114. 
50 Ibid., 168 
51 Rath, Myths of Demilitarization, 83. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Díez, “Legislative Oversight,” 118. 
54 Rath, Myths of Demilitarization, 85–86. 
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each state, including Mexico City, has a military zone, many states are subdivided into 
two or more zones; see Figure 1 for the breakdown.55  
 
 
Figure 1.  Mexican Military Zones56 
He also heavily emphasized the military’s role in education and public works, 
rather than as the guardian of national order.57 ”Mexican military education enforced the 
values and norms needed under the military institution and it taught necessary skills 
while restricting political knowledge, interest, and efficacy.”58 The move to restrict 
influence further normalized objective control over the Mexican army. 
55 Roderic Ai Camp, “MILITARIZING MEXICO: Where is the Officer Corps Going?,” Policy Papers 
on the Americas Volume X Study 1 for the Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS), 
Washington, DC, January 15, 1999, accessed January 12, 2015, 
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/966/1/Militarizing%20Mexico%20Where%20is%
20the%20Officer%20Corps%20Going.pdf?1. 
56Global Security Org, “Military Zones,” accessed January 13, 2015, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/mexico/images/map-zona-militar.jpg 
57 Jordi Díez, Ian Nicholls, and Army War College (U.S.), The Mexican Armed Forces in Transition 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 9, accessed November 21, 2014, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB638.pdf. 
58 Rodriguez, Rank and Privilege, 223. 
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The military’s role, under the government’s direction, was in the beginning stages 
of becoming structuralized—through demilitarization from politics—due to objective 
civilian control. The military was utilized across the country under different pretenses; its 
core role was the application of force and terror against society, which sustained the 
power of the elites. The army assumed the police role in exchange for autonomy, but this 
new responsibility did not negate the fact that it was being tasked to do duties the 
constitution did not explicitly outline. The constitution did not separate military 
responsibilities from the civil judicial system, which allowed the governing party to 
assign those tasks to the military.59 The military served as a pseudo police force since 
various states did not have the resources to build their own civilian institution and also 
exerted high levels of violence, as was the case in Puebla from 1940–1957. Here the 
military became the police force with deeply rooted ideals in politics, where the army 
assumed crucial tasks in social control against rebellions and indirect political tasks—
such as protection of local authorities and mediation of municipal disputes.60 This police 
work was political and allowed officers’ judicial autonomy by allowing them the ability 
to decide the details of where and how their policing mission would be accomplished.61 
The autonomy to dictate the army’s mission was an example of subjective control.  
The civilian utilization of the army and direct militarization in conflictive 
municipalities—through the use of violence—validated the need for roles outside of 
military security. The inevitable use of military force domestically, in the place of civil 
organizations, debunked the post-revolutionary political culture, which called for zero 
military involvement in politics. Subsequently, this retention of militarization prevented 
any military coup d’états during the Cold War, through stability and general consensus 
between the two organizations.62 Professionalism and loyalty instilled in the military 
restricted them from challenging the shift in non-military roles despite the change in 
leadership.  
59 Rath, Myths of Demilitarization, 116 and 119. 
60 Ibid., 122, 124, and 127. 
61 Ibid., 85. 
62 Rath, Myths of Demilitarization, 143. 
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Though this territorial deployment followed a pattern established in 1924, shortly 
after the end of the Mexican revolution, it remained the most viable form of 
accomplishing the Army’s three main missions. The strategic rationale became the need 
for a “blanket of forces” that provided a multi-layer defense system against a 
hypothetically larger and superior invading force. Later, the forces would execute light 
infantry and guerrilla-type operations in order to defeat the invader through attrition. 
Also, the Army’s presence in every major population center, and in some of the most 
remote places in the country, allowed it to have a real-time power projection capability to 
counter an insurrection.63 
C. CHANGES IN POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND ROLE LEADING UP TO 
2000 
Compared to other Latin American countries, Mexico’s armed forces were 
formally under civilian control during the rule of the PRI. Particular developments that 
unfolded after the Mexican Revolution resulted in a political arrangement between the 
civilian government, under the PRI, and the armed forces, where the latter agreed to 
abstain from the deliberation of political matters in exchange for autonomy from civilian 
authorities—as was evident under objective control. This distinct arrangement helped 
explain the stability of the Mexican political system and the fact that, unlike most other 
Latin American countries, Mexico did not experience a military coup d’état in the latter 
part of the twentieth century. However, formal civilian supremacy did not strip the 
military of all political influence as they operated behind the scenes to facilitate political 
communication, stability, and conflict resolution. Moreover, civil-military relations 
during PRI rule were also characterized by significant levels of both institutional and 
political autonomy of the military over its internal operations, training and promotions, as 
well as a high level of discretion in expenditures and equipment procurement. Although 
the military was subordinate to civilian authorities during PRI rule, civilian supremacy 
was, therefore, far from objective civilian control.64 
63 Moyano, Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing Under Fire, 7–8. 
64 Díez, “Legislative Oversight,” 118. 
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Since the Revolution and throughout the twentieth century, the Mexican military 
maintained a significant political role and influence in Mexican politics—under 
subjective control. This influence, which became more evident after World War II, was 
attributed to the military’s role of domestic crisis management in the absence of external 
threats to the country.65 This new role highlighted the military’s lack of training outside 
of war and conflict, and its inability to sheath the physical aspects of its operations.  
In the 1940s, President Ávila Camacho restrained the political goals of the officer 
corps denying sectorial status to the military and decreasing its electoral power, which 
was objective control.66 The military’s political influence remained intact through the 
civic duties it was tasked to accomplish, which included the war on drugs during the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, and a force for provincial stability and civilian leadership’s 
enforcement arm.67 Domestically, the role of the armed forces began to change in the late 
1970s with the increased flow of illegal drugs and corruption within the police forces. To 
help offset this trend, the government created Plan Condor, which directly assigned 
military resources to combat drugs.68 Civic responsibilities and development roles—the 
provision of food and health services in poor and remote areas, infrastructure building, 
and environmental protection—established important and internal roles performed by the 
Mexican military. These civic actions stemmed from Mexico’s need to reach rural areas, 
especially during natural disasters.69 
D. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARMY’S CORE MISSION 
After World War II and before the end of the PRI rule in 2000, the Mexican 
military experienced a more defined mission set that was different from its revolutionary 
upbringing. It saw three critical challenges to its overall structure and internal security, 
65 Wager and Army War College (U.S.), Mexican Military Approaches the 21st Century, 11–12. 
66 Jorge Lozoya, El Ejército Mexicano, 1911–1965 (México City: Colegio de México, 1970), 68–69 in 
Aaron Navarro, Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938–1954 (University Park, 
PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1973), 99. 
67 David Ronfeldt, ed., The Modern Mexican Military: A Reassessment (La Jolla: Center for United 
States –Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 1984), 1–31. 
68 Díez, Nicholls, and Army War College (U.S.), Mexican Armed Forces in Transition, 33. 
69 Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, http://www.sedena.gob.mx/, accessed November 20, 2014. 
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which also affected its mission: the student movement of 1968, the rural insurgency in 
the 1970s, and most recently the struggle with drug trafficking.70 As was evident through 
these cases, the military was tested under subjective civilian control as its post-
revolutionary mission focused on the repression of the population and taking a more 
active role as the police. An increase “in the Mexican army’s size, budget, policing roles, 
and political leverage indicate[d] a remilitarization of the Mexican state,” provided 
autonomy, but also downgraded the civilian control over it.71  
Moving away from the revolutionary narrative, the armed forces began to lose 
fear of civilian authority, which led to an increase in human rights violations. Widespread 
military killings of civilians demonstrated weaknesses within the political leadership and 
independence within the armed forces. Since the government did not properly handle 
domestic conflicts and student uprisings, it tasked the army to confront the 
demonstrations without an established set of guidelines or rules of engagements. In the 
absence of a plan to combat these challenges, the use of force and violence became the 
norm, which left hundreds of students and civilians dead, in many cases, for simply 
questioning government leadership. As a result of these actions, the military lost prestige 
and the civilian population began to lose faith and confidence in the institution.72 These 
events highlighted the severing of the link between the military and the state, which 
changed since the Revolution. Some of these cases, including details about the 
“Tlatelolco Massacre,” will be discussed later.  
E. SHIFTS IN CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE ARMY 
David Ronfeldt referred to the military’s political influence, and the duties it 
carried out in exceptional circumstances, as “residual political roles.” Even under formal 
civilian control, the military continued to influence politics and policy in times of crises 
or when called upon by civilian authorities. Importantly, the civilian-military pact after 
the Revolution provided the military a significant degree of autonomy over its internal 
70 Wager and Army War College, Mexican Military Approaches, 12. 
71 Alicia Hernández Chávez, “Origen y ocaso del ejército porfiriano,” Historia Mexicana 39 (1989), 
285. 
72 Camp, “Mexico,” 274–275. 
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operations, training, and promotions, as well as a high level of discretion in expenditures. 
This autonomy allowed the military to begin making its own decisions, which allowed it 
to gain some independence. However, the unconditional backing of the revolutionary 
élite, and of the revolutionary goals, came in exchange for autonomy in the inner 
workings of the armed forces. Due to that autonomy, the military operated under a great 
deal of secrecy vis-à-vis the government and society at large. Under the PRI, civil-
military relations in Mexico were far from the ideal type of objective civilian control. In 
effect, the anomalies that accompanied civilian control under this rule have been referred 
by some scholars as demonstrating a level of subjective control rather than the latter.73 
As mentioned previously, because of the lack of external threats and its 
geopolitics, the Mexican military maintained a post-revolutionary mission that was 
focused on domestic and internal threats. Accordingly, the Mexican army and air force 
had five general missions: 1) Defense of the integrity, independence, and sovereignty of 
the nation; 2) Internal security; 3) Civic action and social projects that assist in the 
development of the nation; 4) Assist the population in case of public necessity; and 5) 
Assistance to the population in natural disasters. The navy on the other hand had only two 
missions per the Mexican constitution: “use of naval power to ensure external defense 
and to assist in internal security.”74 Although the Revolution helped establish direct 
missions for the armed forces, the lack of civilian-regulated autonomy and accountability 
would later cause friction between the two institutions. 
The Mexican military as a whole enjoyed military autonomy in defense 
organization. As David Pion-Berlin argues,  
Military political autonomy . . .  refers to the military’s aversion towards 
or even defiance of civilian control. While it is part of the state, the 
military often acts as if it were above and beyond the constitutional 
authority of the government. The degree of political autonomy is a 
measure of the military’s determination to strip civilians of their political 
prerogatives and claim these for itself. As the armed forces accumulate 
73 Serrano, “Armed Branch of the State,” 434 and David. Ronfeldt (ed.), Modern Mexican Military A 
Reassessment, (La Jolla: Center for United States –Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 
1984). 
74 Díez, Nicholls, and Army War College (U.S.), Mexican Armed Forces in Transition, 21–22. 
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powers, they become increasingly protective of their gains. The more 
valuable and entrenched their interests are, the more vigorously they will 
resist the transfer of control over these to a democratic leader.75 
As such, military leadership still controls military promotions, retirements, and 
appointments today. Since the Revolution, these actions have remained the exclusive 
domain of the armed forces themselves, with little or no civilian intervention.76 Although 
the military has been able to retain some autonomy and control on its operational aspects, 
to maintain the relationship with politicians, it has been forced to take on roles and adjust 
its mission towards what is required from it. Starting in 1966, the Army began 
implementing disaster relief operations as part of its mission portfolio and participated in 
national vaccination, literacy, nutrition, and reforestation campaigns, which created a 
strong bond between the civilian population and the military.77 The lack of external 
threats forced the government to use the military in this capacity, which again was 
reminiscent of the revolutionary narrative.  
F. ARMY’S ROLE (1980–1990) 
In the 1980s, the size and budget of the Mexican military grew with additional 
assigned policing roles and political leverage until the 1990s—all while under subjective 
control. Despite demilitarization, the growth of crime, insurgency, and drug trafficking in 
the 1990s called for militarization of domestic policing. The political system succeeded 
in adjusting the military’s role as public trust was seen to be superior to that of the 
corrupt police forces.78 
The military continued to find ways to maintain its influence in the government 
due to the decline of political posts after President Carlos Salinas de Gortari took power 
in 1988. With that, the military reached an informal accord between military and civilian 
leaders. This accord established the means by which both organizations would coexist. 
75 David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” 
Comparative Politics 25 (October 1992): 84. 
76 Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies,” 87. 
77 Moyano, Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing Under Fire, 8. 
78 Rath, Myths of Demilitarization, 172. 
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First, the military received autonomy from civilian leadership non-intervention in internal 
military affairs: in expenditures (once budget allocations were given to the armed forces); 
ability of officers to moonlight at other jobs; and in the designation of leaders through 
promotions.79 Second, civilian leadership would publicly praise the armed forces as “an 
honored and prestigious institution in Mexican life . . . identifying the military as a loyal, 
stalwart partner of the state.”80 Third, the military would carry out unrelated actions 
professionally that were designed to sustain civilian leadership, such as impose electoral 
results on the Mexican people, become the guardian of ballots on Election Day (even in 
cases of fraud), maintain order or pacify those civil conflicts involving electoral fraud, 
and suppress dissidence (student, labor, or otherwise).81  
In return for civilian acceptance of these accords, the military would not demand 
sharp increases in the budget, support a small force and technologically-sufficient 
weaponry, and most importantly carry out civilian-mandated police force function.82 
These accords would come into play when the military, with subpar training and 
resources, would undertake a role that is still present in the twenty-first century. As far as 
the military’s role under President Salinas de Gortari, its focus remained on the anti-
narcotics campaign with an increase in interdiction.83  
In Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 
1910–1940, Edwin Lieuwen attributed the depoliticizing of the Mexican military to five 
factors: “1) internecine warfare amongst the rival generals, (2) professionalization of the 
young and middle-rank officers, (3) development of civilian power counterpoised, 
particularly labor and peasants, (4) institutionalization of the political system from 1928–
1940, and (5) the key role of General Cárdenas himself in bringing about the 
depoliticization result.”84 Contrary to Lieuwen’ findings, Roderic Ai Camp said that in 
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fact, “the military never intervened in politics and thus was never removed from politics 
in the 1930s and 1940s.”85 
G. ARMY’S MOVE TO A MORE CONTEMPORARY ROLE (2000–2005) 
While Mexican generals have obeyed rather than deliberated, the absence of 
coups d’états does not mean that the army has been indifferent to political decisions. 
Traditionally, they have expressed their views to the president or secretary of interior 
behind closed doors. Such sub rosa contacts, however, ended during the Fox 
administration (2000–2006). Under President Fox, Defense Secretary de la Vega formally 
presented the activities of SEDENA to a congressional committee for the first time in its 
history.86 While this move legitimized the armed forces to the entire political leadership, 
it was a clear difference in the post-revolutionary structure it was accustomed to. Soon 
after the first official congressional brief, rather than visit Congress, General Guillermo 
Galván invited legislators to meet with him on military installations.87 Again, this was a 
proactive move from the armed forces to sustain the relationship between the two 
institutions and also validate some of its autonomy. 
President Fox’s defense secretary, General Gerardo Clemente R. Vega García 
(2000–2006), followed the practice of briefing civilian cabinet members by appearing 
before a congressional committee to discuss his ministry’s interests, goals, and 
performance.88 Despite President Fox’s pledge to reduce the military’s involvement in 
the fight against drug trafficking during his election campaign, once in office nothing 
changed. On the contrary, the military was given additional responsibilities that were 
explicitly the responsibility of other civil institutions. He used special military battalions 
85 Camp, Generals in the Palacio, 7. 
86 George W. Grayson and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute, The Impact of 
President Felipe Calderón’s War On Drugs On the Armed Forces: The Prospects for Mexico’s 
“militarization” and Bilateral Relations (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2013), 59, accessed October 28, 2014, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1137. 
87 Grayson and Army War College (U.S.), Impact of President Felipe Calderón’s War On Drugs, 59. 
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and intelligence to pursue and arrest drug traffickers, and further utilized the army to 
dismantle and track cartels under commando operations.89 
President Fox’s lack of action validated the need not to maintain a revolutionary 
narrative, but to move more towards transparency. In 2003, with the Access to 
Information Act, he required the armed forces to release information to the public to 
lessen the secrecy of their operations. Although this change did not fundamentally affect 
the civil-military pact, it still allowed the military the autonomy to keep some of the 
prerogatives it had under the PRI because of President Fox’s passivity and weak 
leadership.90 Changes in military control under the PAN maintained some of the 
revolutionary narrative, which kept the military’s mission under civilian control.  
H. MILITARY’S ROLE AND MISSION UNDER PRESIDENT FELIPE 
CALDERÓN (2006–2012) 
Immediately after President Felipe Calderón assumed office in December of 
2006, the military’s role shifted again and almost entirely towards combating organized 
crime and the drug cartels. Although the fight against organized crime was clearly a law 
enforcement matter, the absence of an effective and trustworthy police force required the 
army, navy, and air force to use supplementary forces to defend the civilian population 
and enforce the rule of law. Even though the federal government strove to stand up a 
capable police force in order to relieve and eventually replace the military, that goal was 
never accomplished during the Calderón administration.  
The armed forces continued to be the main implementers of the National Security 
policy, which was aimed at employing the use of force to disrupt the operational capacity 
of organized crime. Their strong institutional tradition, professionalism, submission to 
political control, and history of interaction with the population—mainly through disaster 
relief efforts—made them the most trusted institution in Mexican society. Mexico’s 
armed forces have long been used as an instrument of the state to implement all kinds of 
public policies at the national level, from emergency vaccinations, to post-earthquake 
89 Díez, Nicholls, and Army War College (U.S.), Mexican Armed Forces in Transition, 33. 
90 Díez, Legislative Oversight, 125–126. 
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rescue, to reforestation campaigns.91 As an instrument of the state, the military was also 
tasked with the role of running penitentiaries and overseeing customs operations because 
of the trust and loyalty it possessed. Its revolutionary loyalty and ethos remained intact, 
which helped it sustain its role and mission under the state. 
In response to seizures, escapes, and excessive control of the prisons by organized 
crime groups, along with corruption amongst leadership, the army was dispatched to 
control the institutions. Such conditions prompted the government to dispatch army units 
to conduct searches in penitentiaries and sometimes take control of the institutions 
themselves. In mid-August 2009, General Felipe de Jesús Espitia, commander of the 
Fifth Military Zone, announced that troops would replace civilian administrators and 
guards at Cereso of Aquiles Serdán, located in the heart of the state of Chihuahua. This 
action followed the resignation of the warden after three of his bodyguards were killed.92 
Military men now serve as directors of the penal facilities in the three largest cities in 
Quintana Roo. In late April 2011, General Carlos Bibiano Villa Castillo, the state’s 
secretary of public security, placed officers in charge of the Cereso in Chetumal (Captain 
José de Jesús Moreno Abad), the Cereso in Cancún (General Eulalio Rodríguez 
Valdivia), and the jails in Playa del Carmen (Second Captain José Luis y Peniche 
Novelo) and Cancún (Captain Higinio Sánchez Baltazar).93 Imposing military rule and 
organization in prisons contributed to better order and security, which is still a post-
revolutionary role and mission. 
The spread of corruption, especially in combating the drug war “redefine[d] the 
military’s potential role, and expose[d] it to forces that [could] threaten its internal 
cohesiveness and loyalty.”94 After 2000, Presidents Fox and Calderón sought to fight 
corruption amongst customs agents—a Herculean challenge because of the lucrative 
payments to officials who either close their eyes to smuggling or took part in the crime. 
91 Moyano, Inigo Guevara., and Army War College (U.S.), Strategic Studies Institute, Adapting, 
Transforming, and Modernizing Under Fire: The Mexican Military, 2006–11 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011), vii, accessed October 28, 2014, 
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To combat this trend, the armed forces took over the functions of the fiscal police in 
forty-nine land ports across the northern border in August 2009; the navy began also 
overseeing customs operations in seaports.95 The army on the other hand was tasked to 
accomplish other duties, which were more inland. Unlike the navy, the army was tasked 
to guard and protect elections, create a brigade of firefighters for emergency use, and also 
provide security at soccer championships.96 Although the armed forces helped minimize 
corruption from within some of these governmental agencies, military leadership 
continued rotating zone commanders more frequently to prevent senior leaders from 
falling into the same situation.97 This counter-action and shift in roles prevented some 
corruption, which was another change since the revolution. 
I. MILITARY’S ROLE AND MISSION UNDER PRESIDENT ENRIQUE 
PEÑA NIETO (2012–PRESENT) 
After entering office, President Peña Nieto made it clear that he wanted a new 
security strategy where the military would stop assuming the role of the police. He 
mentioned that both the army and navy would continue to fight drug cartels, but would 
change President Calderón’s strategy of direct confrontation to reduce violence.98 His 
intent was to return thousands of soldiers back to the barracks, a move that SEDENA 
applauded, in light of the NGO criticism of human rights abuses and corruption, as well 
as the prevalence of mental illness among troops.99 At the same time, he recognized that 
the involvement of the navy and the support forces of the Federal Police could grow in 
light of their success in fighting criminals during the last few decades.100 President Peña 
Nieto unveiled a “six point security initiative . . . that would shift the primary focus of 
95 Grayson and Army War College, Impact of President Felipe Calderón’s War, 65–66. 
96 Ibid., 66–68. 
97 Camp, Generals in Palacios, 59. 
98 “Mexican president says army will continue in fight against drug traffickers,” Canadian Press, 
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Mexico’s drug wars from that of hunting down cartels and their capos to preventing and 
curbing murders, kidnappings, and extortion.”101 This move became the first real attempt 
to legitimize the role of the military by removing it from a mission that has been 
unjustified since after the Revolution, and under PRI rule, and replacing it with a new 
organization. 
By strengthening the government’s ability to govern, creating a paramilitary 
National Gendarmerie (GN) to combat violence and instability, and reconfiguring police 
functions, President Peña Nieto hopes to alleviate some of the workload the military has 
endured in the past. The establishment of the Gendarmerie—a new security force of 
potentially forty thousand police and military members—will not create tension between 
the civil-military relationship or require a change in the constitution to establish a single 
secretary over both the army and the navy.102 Although the president intends to reshape 
the military’s role, the military will continue to plead to Congress the need to amend the 
Code of Military Justice to explicitly justify and allow the military’s involvement in 
combating cartels. Ultimately, the military requires protection from NGOs who have 
accused senior officers of war crimes before the International Court of Justice and other 
tribunals—as has already occurred with charges against President Calderón.103  
Despite combating cartels and drugs trafficking, President Peña Nieto has also 
mentioned participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions; using the military for these 
missions would be the first in more than sixty years. This move would be more 
substantiated as the constitution allows the Senate to authorize these deployments beyond 
the nation’s borders.104 This request, however, will not be the first request sent to the 
Senate and Congress since the Revolution.  
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In September 2005, President Fox ordered the first deployment of Mexican 
troops, and a battleship, in support of Hurricane Katrina humanitarian efforts in the 
U.S.105 Although this branching out—from exclusively a post-revolutionary domestic 
role—attempted to establish a path towards modernity it violated the constitution because 
it was deployed without prior approval. The idea to move soldiers outside of Mexico, 
away from their domestic roles, and into peacekeeping operations, highlighted leadership 
weaknesses within President Fox’s administration because this had never been proposed 
before. The attempted shift from solely a domestic capacity to an international role 
highlighted political restrictions, which hindered progress within the armed forces. A 
move outside of the domestic norm and into the international scene could help the 
military develop and modernize, but it is not guaranteed without political support. 
Furthermore, this would force the government to bestow more autonomy to the armed 
forces in order for modernization to occur, for the better good of the institution and the 
country as a whole.  
J. SUMMARY OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP 
After the 1930s, as was evident under the PRI, the civil-military relationship in 
Mexico was characterized by formal civilian control of the armed forces. This 
relationship functioned because of a civil-military pact where the armed forces offered 
complete loyalty to the president and civilian leaders in return for autonomy in the 
internal running of their operations. However, because the military was given the residual 
political role, it can be argued that this relationship under PRI rule was far from objective 
civilian control.106  
An important consequence of the pact between the two institutions was that 
civilian authority did not exert complete control on the armed forces; the procurement of 
military equipment and the promotions process remained in the hands of military 
leadership. Mexican Congress lacked complete oversight where the legislature, under the 
civil-military pact, restricted congressional control of the internal running of the military, 
105 Díez, “Legislative Oversight,” 134. 
106 Ibid., 141. 
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despite stipulations outlined in the Mexican Constitution. This oversight, later changed 
under PRI rule, culminated with its electoral defeat in 2000, allowing the emergence of 
Congress as a powerful political institution.107 
Through Jordi Díez’ analysis, the armed forces’ oversight remained under civilian 
control with the exception of allowing regular appearances of Defense Ministers to 
address congressional committees for questioning, and the release of information on 
equipment inventory and procurement. Nonetheless, his data showed that legislative 
oversight remained weak in a variety of areas; dealing with allegations of human rights 
abuses, the deployment of troops abroad, and the acquisition of weaponry. Despite not 
having total control, the civil-military pact never really fundamentally changed and the 
Mexican armed forces continued to operate with a significant degree of autonomy. 
Because of the lack of interest and knowledge in military matters, civilians generalized 
approval of the armed forces’ performance and legitimized their role and mission. 
However, this perception and the arbitrary assignment of military roles, out of their 
purview, allowed them to legislate rather than oversee the functions of federal 
institutions. Nevertheless, members of Congress did not take any significant steps toward 
increasing oversight of the military, and thus legislative oversight has remained weak.108 
As was evident, the revolutionary narrative and structure of the armed forces 
changed under the various shifts in civilian control. The different transitional changes 
helped the military remain resilient despite the various shifts and changes in its roles and 
missions, and also made it a stronger force. These experiences will be paramount as it 
moves more towards modernity and an international presence. 
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The events, rhetoric, and geopolitical representations of the Mexican Revolution 
still influence the contemporary narrative and ethos of the Mexican armed forces. Even 
though the military continues to be subordinate to civilian control and its hierarchical 
structure remains intact, the respect towards it as a state institution has begun to erode. 
The societal respect and trust that was once present is gradually being lost due to the 
human rights violations and the deflections of military members to organized crime. 
Despite these challenges, the military’s loyalty and ethos continues to remain status quo.  
Even though the Revolution continues to have some influence, there have been 
some changes to the armed forces. First, the Mexican military is now a tool of the 
government and not of one particular party. Second, there has been a change in the 
public’s view and trust of the military due to the human rights and abuse of power issues. 
Third, the military has lost some autonomy with respect to how it handles its internal 
discipline and military crimes—as these actions are now being turned over to the civilian 
sector for prosecution. And finally, President Peña Nieto is now contemplating the 
expansion of the military’s role in the United Nations and internationally, signaling a 
significant change from its domestic role since the Revolution. 
B. THE EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY 
For the first time since the 71-year, PRI-controlled presidency, democracy tested 
the loyalty between the military and the state. When President Miguel Aleman took office 
in 1946, as the first civilian head of state since the Revolution, a “non-written civil-
military pact” was established between civilian leadership of the PRI and the Mexican 
military. This pact set the conditions for the president to recognize and respect the 
military institution, and for the armed forces to reciprocate equal respect to civilian 
leadership. However, the armed forces were forced to follow a set of rules, institutional 
norms, and doctrine that were established after President Calles’ tenure. This direction 
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combined with the military’s institutional loyalty to the PRI, caused friction in the 
democratization process.109 Today, the armed forces maintain that democratic loyalty and 
support, but with some reservations due to the assigned roles and missions that are 
outside of the confines of the constitution.  
Since the Revolution, the Mexican military’s mission has been focused mainly on 
internal and domestic affairs. In the early twentieth century, it was established as a force 
to execute light infantry and guerrilla warfare operations across the country. This military 
presence and role throughout the country allowed the government to deter insurgencies, 
and also gave them reassurance and trust. As was evident during the PRI era and now in 
the twenty-first century, the armed forces assumed additional responsibilities, which were 
social in nature and unjustly outside of their scope. As Guevaro Moyano noted, “the 
Army [implemented] disaster relief operations as part of its mission portfolio, and 
participated in national vaccination, literacy, nutrition, and reforestation campaigns, 
which [also] created a strong bond between the civilian population and the military.”110 
Though these domestic and social roles, still reminiscent of the Revolution, justified the 
military’s status and mission in the public eye, it negated its stature as a modernizing 
force in the international realm.  
Nevertheless, this military role has been dramatically transformed in the last 
decade. The rise in drug trafficking and organized crime redirected the military to 
combating these security threats caused by transnational criminal organizations and 
gangs.111 ”Despite the enormous amounts of money and forces directed to this effort, the 
uncommon and disproportionate war between a clandestine and invincible enemy 
supported by international networks and funds, and a traditional and limited army, has 
frequently dragged many of its members into corruption and treachery. Each year it is 
109 José Francisco Gallardo, Always Near, Always Far: The Armed Forces in Mexico (Mexico, DF: 
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known that several army officials and soldiers have accepted bribes from drug gangs.”112 
The transformation of the military’s role and mission under the PRI signaled the 
transition from the tool of the PRI to a stronger and more direct legislative oversight 
under the PAN. With the election of President Fox, democratic legitimacy was 
acknowledged through the first internationally recognized “clean and fair election in 
contemporary Mexico.”113 His inauguration on December 1, 2000, confirmed Mexico’s 
transition away from authoritarianism to the country’s first democratic government in 
nearly a century.114 This transformation, however, created challenges with control 
between the state and the military, and sustaining the relationship in the future.  
C. MEXICAN MILITARY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
1. Military Transition from One-Party to Government Control 
A byproduct of the Revolution was the civil-military cooperation and 
revolutionary ideals that formed under the establishment of the one-party state in 
Mexico.115 Even though this one-party state functioned under the tenure of the PRI, it 
soon changed with the arrival of the PAN in 2000 and again with the PRI in 2012. The 
takeaway from the transition was that the weaknesses, under the one-party rule after the 
Revolution, required more centralized government control that was purposely overlooked 
under the PRI. 
Though the PAN attempted to reorganize the military under a more centralized 
government in 2000, its future role and mission remained unclear even after 2012. While 
campaigning for president in 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto supported keeping the presence 
of soldiers and marines in high crime states and areas to resume the security role 
established by his predecessors Presidents Fox and Calderón. While his move was to 
112 Laura Randall, Changing Structure of Mexico: Political, Social, and Economic Prospects (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), 378, accessed January 15, 2015, 
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organize the military, it contradicted his original stance to return soldiers to the 
barracks.116 
His rationale then was to keep the armed forces in charge, in the absence of an 
established civilian law and resource, which lacked sufficient training, professionalism, 
and equipment required to carry out this important mission.117 Additionally, he stated 
that the control of the military was to be the task of the Mexican state, and that the 
actions of the armed forces should be carried out only on the orders of the government 
and not as an exclusive task of individual political parties.118 Although this revolutionary 
rhetoric kept the armed forces subordinate to the PRI until 2000, the last three presidents 
have since supported controlling the armed forces entirely as the tool of the government. 
This mentality established a new Mexican civil-military relationship where the military 
became subordinate to a stronger legislative oversight, which prompted a shift from the 
revolutionary one-party rhetoric. This shift would act as the required vehicle to ensure 
accountability and prevent further shielding of the armed forces from the law.  
Under the one-party rule, Congress did not have complete oversight of the armed 
forces, which allowed it to operate with autonomy. This autonomy contributed to 
corruption where the PRI allowed retired military generals and admirals to fill 
congressional seats.119 This revolutionary narrative contributed to corruption and further 
weakened an already brittle relationship between the two institutions. Ultimately, these 
political institutions were weakened because of the president’s high centralization of 
power—through corporatism and the exercise of unwritten and assumed powers.120 
Subsequently, the need to strengthen the control of the military in the twenty-first 
century, as a tool of the government and not of a one-party hierarchical structure, became 
the central goal in contemporary Mexico. 
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2.  Changes to the Modern Military’s Leadership and Structure 
In the last decade, the Mexican armed forces have been in unfamiliar territory as 
its political intentions, structure, loyalty to civilian rule, and its role in the war against 
organized crime have questioned its narrative. The change in political control in the 
twenty-first century also created a drastic effect on public security. This political 
transition ‘‘disrupted a once stable and predictable system of official corruption” where 
the relationship between organized crime and the PRI—a loose but mutually desirable 
union—was dissolved definitively as the PAN assumed the presidency and won many 
governor seats in 2000.121 The PAN brought with it a shift from the revolutionary 
narrative of controlling the military unilaterally, to a more centralized and bureaucratic 
hierarchy, where the government collectively could dictate its roles and missions. Unlike 
the PRI, the PAN wanted to create a vehicle whereas, regardless of the political party in 
office at the time, the control of the military would be a governmental responsibility.122  
The structure of Mexico’s armed forces continues to be complex and different 
from other militaries in the Western Hemisphere. President Lázaro Cárdenas introduced a 
structural change that was supposed to reduce the military’s power and expand its range 
of skills. Dividing the Mexican Armed Forces into two autonomous departments—
SEDENA and SEMAR—and leaving the Mexican Air Force subordinate to its army 
counterpart, became the Mexican military’s structure after the Revolution.123 President 
Cárdenas’ action did remove military influence and power from politics, but at the same 
time gave it undue autonomy; autonomy that the elite feared would later interfere with 
their control and governance. The structure nonetheless did not provide the tools 
necessary for the military to be autonomous. 
Today the government continues to lack the state resources and an established 
checks-and-balances system to both combat crime and also deal with the human rights 
abuses, which have sequestered the public eye in recent years. As the role of the armed 
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forces expanded to combating drug trafficking, these human rights violations increased, 
leaving the state without the tools to address them. Although non-government 
organizations had the ability to investigate these cases, they did not have the strength nor 
the tools to have a sustained effect on shaping public policy.124 This deficiency 
undermined the power of the state, which then affected the public’s trust in the 
militarization of security. 
Another facet of the military structure that was soon to change was the 
establishment of the Gendarmerie. Even though this was intended to solve the unjustified 
utilization of the military, as was mentioned in Chapter II, it does not seem to be the case 
today as President Peña Nieto has pulled back on making it operational. The Gendarmerie 
was supposed to lessen the role of the military against cartels, but it never gained support 
from the beginning. It was supposed to be a separate civilian-military hybrid force—with 
a military construct, but under civilian control—of over 40,000 members initially to now, 
a potential force of 5,000, subordinate to the Federal Police. Without clear operational 
goals and the political support needed for it to become a successful organization, it is 
difficult to see if it will ever come to the aid of the military.125 
D. THE MEXICAN MILITARY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
As mentioned previously, the Mexican armed forces’ role, mission, and structure 
has changed since the Revolution and more importantly, in the last fourteen years. While 
the military’s role and mission remained status quo during these past years, President 
Calderón’s shift to counter-narcotics in 2006 changed the way the armed forces were 
utilized and provided institutional leverage. Although the military has been actively 
engaged against the drug cartels, it has had its share of negative experiences, which have 
undermined its work and progress since 2000. The most prominent is the human rights 
abuses which continue to occur under the present counter-narcotics campaign. These 
abuses affect the military’s credibility in the public eye and also signal a weakening in 
124 Navarro, “Nature of Mexican Politics,” 535-536. 
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civilian control. President Calderón’s policy—toward the drug trafficking 
organizations—came with a rather steep price tag, giving the military renewed political 
standing.126 With this political opportunity came also a level of autonomy that left the 
government with the dilemma of trying to take some of it back and keeping the armed 
forces happy at the same time.  
Some of SEDENA’s contemporary challenges of the past few years involve, 
predominantly, human rights violations and the attempted cover-ups. These violations are 
concentrated on the Mexican army, but the lack of accountability and action from the 
military justice system as a whole, has tarnished the entire Mexican armed forces. The 
violations, “resulting from corruption and the absence of law and order are the central 
issues in Mexico today.”127 Despite carrying out the roles and missions established by the 
government, the Mexican army’s track record and SEDENA’s laissez-faire approach 
demonstrate that the sheltering of the military, which was acceptable under PRI rule, 
continues to be indicative of the revolutionary narrative. 
Aside from the civilian control aspect and autonomy, holding the armed forces 
accountable for its actions is a major change in the management of the military, since the 
Revolution; more specifically, the human rights violations and abuse of power allegations 
the military has been accused of in the last few years. The military, which has led anti-
drug efforts in the past, has been stained by allegations that soldiers continually abuse 
their power, which have led to integrity and trust issues. In June 2014, it was reported 
that the army had killed suspects who had already surrendered. Although there were 
different versions of the actions, the army acted unlawfully, but Federal Attorney General 
Jesus Murillo Karam turned an eye and did not investigate these complaints until three 
months later.128 Since being in office, President Peña Nieto has dealt with the abuse of 
126 Navarro, “Nature of Mexican Politics,” 532. 
127 “The Obama/Peña Nieto Reunion,” La Opinion, January 9, 2015, accessed January, 9, 2015, 
http://www.laopinion.com/opinioneditorial/article/20150106/The-ObamaPena-Nieto-Reunion. 
128 Katherine Corcoran, “Analysis: Mexico Scandals expose government without answers,” 




                                                 
power and human rights violations within the armed forces, most recently with the case 
in Tlatlaya, Mexico City.129 
In the Tlatlaya incident, army personnel killed twenty-two people; twelve of them 
execution-style, inside of an empty warehouse in Mexico City. The military denied its 
involvement, but through various witness accounts and a report by the National Human 
Rights Commission, Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH), the 
government demanded action.130 Three months after the incident, the CNDH prompted 
the military justice system to act swiftly and hold the military accountable for these 
actions. Although the government was slow in reacting, it detained twenty-four soldiers 
and one lieutenant allegedly for participating in the incident, accusing eight of them with 
a breach of military discipline and charging them with an undue and unjust exercise of 
public service; three of which, were also charged with abuse of authority, aggravated 
homicide, and crime scene altering. In addition, the officer was charged with trying to 
cover-up the killings.131 Due to recent Mexican Supreme Court rulings, as result of legal 
interpretations of the law, the Tlatlaya case was turned over to civilian prosecutors.132  
Erubiel Tirado says that: “the government strategy of the last two years has been 
just like that, sacrificing some troops and an intermediate officer in order to shelter 
themselves behind the tale of disobedience and a lack of military protocol 
application.”133 This incident became an important event for President Peña Nieto; his 
oversight demonstrated the commitment to a human rights policy distinct from that of his 
predecessor President Calderón, where he was forced to take the appropriate measure to 
hold the army accountable for the massacre.134 This along with the political pressure he 
129 Mexico’s Voices: The Limits of Civilian Control, accessed January 9, 2015, 
http://mexicovoices.blogspot.com/2014/10/mexicos-army-limits-of-civilian-control.html. 
130 “Mexico: Delays, Cover-Up Mar Atrocities Response,” Human Rights Watch, November 7, 2014, 
accessed December 23, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/07/mexico-delays-cover-mar-atrocities-
response. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Tracy Wilkinson, “A Major Test for Pena Nieto; Mexico’s Inquiry on a Mass Killing by the Army 
Will Reflect on His Rights Pledge,” Los Angeles Times, Sep 27, 2014, accessed December 23, 
2014,http://search.proquest.com/docview/1565624382?accountid=12702. 
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was under, required him to demand action and take a more decisive role despite what he 
wanted. In dealing with the incident, he and the government showed great initiative and 
accountability, which helped sustain society’s positive view of the military.  
In light of other challenges within SEDENA, the loss of autonomy, in terms of 
handling its military internal discipline, was the most crucial. The Tlatlaya case forced 
the government to move away from the military judiciary system and utilize civilian 
courts in prosecuting military crimes.135 Until the last few years, the constitution had 
provided the military with a type of jurisdiction—disciplinary actions independent from 
political affairs—that could not, “under any circumstances (except for the emergency 
situations described by the Constitution itself in Article 29), be extended to ordinary 
citizens. Any crime or misdemeanor committed by military members [was] subject to be 
treated by military courts and not by ordinary courts.”136  
Since President Calderón tasked the military to fight drug organizations in 2006, 
“soldiers have been accused of illegal detentions, torture and killing civilians at 
checkpoints, among other abuses, as they carried out policing actions and operations 
against the gangs across the country.”137 Between 2007 and 2012, the Mexican armed 
forces “opened nearly 5,000 investigations into criminal wrongdoing by soldiers against 
civilians . . . but only 38 ended in sentencing, according to Human Rights Watch.”138 The 
military’s inadequate handling of these issues prompted human rights groups to petition 
reform to end the military’s jurisdiction for cases involving crimes against civilians, since 
military trials failed to prosecute these crimes under the federal justice system.139 
Another contributing factor to the problem or to the lack of action, within the military 
justice system is the power of SEDENA. SEDENA retains both executive and judicial 
135 Michael O’Boyle and Ken Wills, “Mexico votes to allow civilian trials for soldiers,” Reuters, 
April 24, 2014, accessed January 14, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/01/us-mexico-military-
idUSBREA4002520140501. 
136 Randall, Changing Structure of Mexico, 378. 




                                                 
power over the military, which undermines the role of military judges, and ultimately 
contributes to the lack of accountability and integrity.140  
E. MILITARY’S CONTEMPORARY LOYALTY AND ETHOS  
Regardless of the challenges the armed forces experiences, its loyalty and ethos 
will continue to be important qualities for new generations to come. Laura Randall says, 
“The Mexican armed forces have remained silent and loyal actors in turbulent times of 
transformation, despite the fact that some changes have altered their own stability.”141 
Despite the turbulent times within the armed forces, it is surprising to see that there have 
not been any explicit clashes with the state. As odd as it might seem, some of the post-
revolutionary ideas and structure prevent this type of behavior. Among those is the 
military’s contemporary professional military education (PME) and training. According 
to SEDENA: 
a physical, mental, and cultural transformation of men and women, to 
convince and commit them to voluntarily surrender their loyalty, skills, 
abilities, intelligence, and life itself to the country and its institutions, if 
necessary, to meet the duties imposed by the armed services.142 
Subsequently, the military continues to remain loyal to civilian rule. Friedrich 
Katz says that the Mexican Army has a “clearly observable anti-militarist tradition.”143 
Because of this professionalism, which was established during and since the 
Revolution by the PRI, the military still retains a great level of loyalty towards the 
government. This loyalty and ethos present within the Mexican armed forces still allows 
the government to maintain total control, and dictate the role and missions it requires, 
whether or not it remains within the confines of the constitution. Prior to 2000, the 
Mexican armed forces had a relatively free hand in terms of budget allocations, internal 
140 “Mexico: Hold Military to Account on Rights Abuses,” Huntington Post, updated May, 25, 2011, 
accessed January 14, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/human-rights-watch/mexico-hold-military-to-
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promotions and assessment, and the day-to-day management of military policy. In 2015, 
the relationship seems to remain consistent where civilians exact political loyalty from 
the military, while denying its members the opportunity to get involved with politics—
mainly in competing for political office. As this civil-military relationship continues to 
develop, the real test will be to see if these policies will remain intact. However, the 
increased military demands in counternarcotic operations provide a new source of 
leverage, where generals seek to request larger budgets with little civilian oversight.144 
As military leaders continue to hold on to this leverage, it will be interesting to see when 
they decide to utilize it and the effects it will have on the relationship. 
F. CHANGE IN FUTURE MISSION: MOVE FROM THE 
REVOLUTIONARY STRUCTURE? 
Besides the challenges within the institution, the military seems to be on a path 
towards structural change and modernity; updating the country’s National Defense Plan 
and making it more joint is the first step. Upon assuming the presidency in 2006, 
President Calderón tasked SEDENA to create a Sectorial National Defense Plan for the 
country. His intent was to establish an apparatus to plan and conduct military activities in 
accordance with the priorities and objectives identified in the National Development 
Plan. This plan, similar to the U.S. National Security Strategy, was an attempt at 
providing a sense of transparency to the military’s new role in combating internal 
criminal organizations.145 Even though the iteration establishes the domestic roles that 
were outlined in the previous chapter, it failed to include anything in reference to 
international involvement, which will be discussed later.  
1. Change in Structure 
Despite the fact that the military’s structural configuration and hierarchy has not 
been ideal, in terms of modernity and jointness, it is still present today and continues to 
be influenced by its revolutionary rhetoric. Although not an ideal structure, each branch 
144 Navarro, “Nature of Mexican Politics,” 532. 
145 Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, “Misión,” SEDENA, accessed December 31, 2014, 
http://www.sedena.gob.mx/index.php/educacion-militar. 
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continues to have its own autonomy and no relationship or togetherness exists between 
the services. In 2013, President Peña Nieto pushed another military initiative, this time 
ordering both defense secretariats to develop a Joint National Defense Policy. This move 
was in response to the rivalry that exists and the unwillingness of the two military 
institutions to work together towards joint operations. Working together would allow the 
individual services to work and address their internal security challenges more efficiently 
using each other’s strengths and lessons learned. This push would improve the structure 
and hierarchy in the military whereas it could mirror the U.S.’s structure. A move 
towards establishing a General Staff or Joint Chief of Staff in Mexico would help 
organize the armed forces under a more efficient configuration. Nevertheless, until this 
happens, both ministries continue to maintain a very linear structure with extreme loyalty 
to their civilian leadership. Inigo Guevara Moyano explained that: “this policy should 
lead to a redefinition of the Mexican Defense system and its linkages with other sectors 
of the federal government.”146  
2. United Nations Involvement 
Another significant change to the revolutionary rhetoric and the armed forces—
under President Peña Nieto’s control—is expanding Mexican military operations through 
deployments outside of Mexico. Since the Revolution, and more specifically after WWII, 
the military has been restricted to domestic security and combating drug cartels, which 
could change very soon. In September 2014, President Peña Nieto announced that his 
government was planning to have the Mexican armed forces participate in future United 
Nations humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.147 His intent is to gradually increase 
Mexico’s involvement and presence in these types of missions internationally. With 
President Peña Nieto’s intent to participate in these U.N. peace missions, it will be 
interesting to see whether or not the military is prepared to fulfill this function 
146 Inigo Guevara Moyano, “Comando Y Control: Político De Defensa Y Planeación Militar,” 
México Seguridad, accessed December 31, 2014, http://www.mexicoseguridad.mx/site/?p=26. 
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Against Drug Cartels,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, Sep 24, 2014, accessed December 30, 2014, 
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democratically, with due transparency similar to other countries without transforming its 
own institution. 148 
In summary, the Mexican armed forces are still influenced by a revolutionary 
narrative, which continues to help it develop into a stronger military in the twenty-first 
century. From its inception after the Revolution in 1920 and through 2000, the military 
experienced a transition from a one-party apparatus—in charge of protecting the PRI and 
handling domestic affairs—to exclusive utilization under legislative rule. This experience 
provided autonomy, which contributed to the change in structure and reach in 2015, and 
also to us these experiences for further development and modernization. 
Though it has been difficult since 1920 to look beyond the assigned and 
unjustified roles and missions, under objective and subjective civilian control, the 
Mexican military’s loyalty has helped keep it grounded. This is important especially with 
the false promises and talks of the last three years about returning it back to the barracks 
and replacing its counternarcotics mission with the Gendarmerie. With all of the turmoil 
it has endured in the last eighty-six years, the armed forces look to finally validate its role 
of protector of the republic with its pending shift, from solely a domestic role, to 
international significance with the upcoming the U.N. opportunity.149 When and if 
Congress approves this constitutional change, the Mexican military has the potential to 




148 Mexico’s Voices: The Limits of Civilian Control. 
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